Preface

My desire to study Dwight David Eisenhower grew out of my fascination with his stature as an American icon; any academic motives I may have had were subordinated to this acute need.

Although I was initially intrigued by the more recent heroic equivalent, Colin Powell, it had been brought to my attention by my advisor, Professor Fred I. Greenstein, that there were many parallels between these two men. It became clear that a comprehensive study of Eisenhower’s path to the White House would not only satiate my personal fascination with heroes but would also allow me to study a more substantive and dynamic element of modern American politics: how generals, as Washington outsiders, figure into presidential election politics. Thanks to this fusion of hobby-like fascination with academic interest, my senior thesis experience has been very enjoyable.

Rather than start with an arresting statement that introduces the more substantive, academic aspects of my paper, I felt that it would be more appropriate to begin where I first began -- with my fascination of the American hero. The following anecdotes portray my humble relations to Dwight Eisenhower. I, like Eisenhower before me, enjoy reading about hero’s for the sake of using them as models to which I can aspire. These anecdotes are given at this early stage in the paper not so much to prove a point or to build an argument but to show how my mind initially reacted to the prospects of studying a hero. They are meant to set the mood of the paper. The reader may also wish to ponder the questions that this paper addresses: Why is the American voter so favorably disposed to a military hero? And, how can a candidate with little governmental experience be elected to the White House? Without further ado, the stories.

As a sixteen year old member of my high school debate team, I occasionally indulged in individual speech contests for the sake of variety and experience. On one occasion, I had to present my perspective of "What the American Flag Meant to Me" to a panel of Lyon’s Club members. There were six other contestants, and being the last speaker on the agenda, I had the misfortune of listening to how the flag had affected my peers in emotional and patriotic ways. I felt my stomach toss and turn -- not just because I was nervous about giving my speech but because of my speech’s substance. When I had my crack at the question I concluded that even though I was subject to all the imagery and rhetoric that is part of the American experience (e.g. singing the national anthem at baseball games or digesting various tokenism’s during campaign stump speeches and spot ads), I had no real personal tie to the Stars and Stripes. To me, it seemed inaccurate and superficial to say, as some of my peers did, that the flag had meant something to them just because that is what they had been led to believe. The thesis of my speech was that the American flag can only truly be significant to someone who is a participant in the political process rather than an observer of it. Only under these conditions (e.g. grassroots politics, diplomatic relations, elective offices, etc.), it seems, can someone have a personal bond to the flag.

As I calmly sat down in my seat, the panelists -- retired World War II veterans who were not only dressed in their finest uniforms but, to make matters worse, were top-heavy from the weight of their medals -- groped for their water glasses and seemed to almost fall out of their seats as a result of their downward momentum (i.e. heads bowing, jaws openly suspended in disbelief). It is true that a boy’s memories of an incident are subject to distortion over time. However, I can say for sure that there was considerably more tension and stagnant silence in the room during my speech than during any other and that I, at least, initiated a pulse check across the board. I was not given first prize, but I had the consolation of knowing that my speech was sincere.

Just two years later, my feelings about the American flag and my country were reversed as a result of two life-defining events. In February of 1992, I was chosen as the sole United States representative to play in the Liberation Cup in Kuwait. This squash tournament was organized as a token of gratitude for the countries who aided in the liberation of Kuwait. As the sole American, I was treated like a king. Indeed, my air-fare, hotel, and eating arrangements were paid for. For two weeks, through the stubborn insistence of my hosts, I was "Captain Jason." When I walked around the streets, people waved and smiled. I dined and shopped with the Emir of Kuwait. I even had my own chauffeur. My role was diplomatic as well as athletic in that I discussed a broad range of issues with representatives from 20 different countries. As a diplomat of the United States -- coupled with the house-warming effect -- I felt, for the first time, like I was personally bonded to my country.

The second incident took place in August 1992 at the World Junior Squash Championships, Hong Kong. The opening ceremonies were very Olympic-like in that the 34 participating countries paraded around a large auditorium. Each team, comprised of four players and a coach, carried their respective flags. As the flag bearer for my team, I was overwhelmed with pangs of patriotism. In an environment where I was challenging so many other "flags," I felt, for the first time, very emotionally attached to mine. As I shook the hand of the last British Governor of Hong Kong, I could not help but think of the speech that I gave two years before and how I had changed so profoundly. My bond to the American flag and my country were forever changed.

Dwight David Eisenhower went through a similar metamorphosis. Born in 1890, Eisenhower grew up in the small town of Abilene, Kansas. The first presidential election he observed was between William McKinley and William Jennings Bryan in 1896. As a six year old, Ike was awestruck by the grandeur of the processions, but an observer nonetheless.

When Ike graduated from high school, the idea of excelling in sports (football and baseball in particular) dominated his mind. After graduation, he remained in Abilene for a year and worked at the local creamery. During his spare time, he ate ice cream, played cards with friends, and went hunting. Based on these preoccupation’s, there is no reason to believe that Eisenhower, as a 20 year old roughneck, had a stronger bond to his country than did the typical observer. But there was plenty of time to develop this bond; Ike was still a boy.

Persuaded by his best boyhood friend, Swede, Ike pursued an education in the armed forces. Because of the Naval Academy's age regulations, Ike was resigned to accepting admission to his second choice, West Point. Ike developed his first patriotic ties as a cadet at West Point. Although he may not have consciously realized it at the time (i.e. his mind was still preoccupied with sports), his entrance to West Point in 1911 provided a life-defining event. As a cadet at "The Point," Eisenhower felt his allegiance growing as a result of wearing the academy’s gray uniform and marching with his corp to the beat of martial music. But, Ike was profoundly affected when he took the United States Army’s oath of allegiance. Upon taking this honor Ike said, "The flag itself suddenly meant something."

Ike’s ultimate allegiance gelled after serving as color sergeant at West Point. With this honor, he was to say to his son John during World War II: "I was very proud of it. No man can carry the national flag through a West Point year and not experience within him the growth of a certain patriotism that stays with him always."

Ike’s allegiance to the flag and to America grew as he aged. Many biographies have been written about the life and times of Eisenhower. And, out of the many reprocessed stories that are told, the one consistent theme that stands apart from the rest and serves as the core of Ike’s image as a hero was his unequivocal response to duty. Apart from his short tenure as president of Columbia University, he served all of his adult years in some form of government. Indeed, as Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces during World War II, Chief of Staff of the Army, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander of NATO, and a two-term United States President, Eisenhower was the embodiment of a hero. Few could resist his dopey grin, warm personality and commanding voice. Only the jealous distanced themselves from a man who was otherwise so well liked and respected by the country’s citizens and elites that he was mandated to run for office. Alf Landon of Kansas captured this fervor in a 1947 statement: "The spontaneous and growing sentiment for the nomination of General Eisenhower is the most amazing phenomenon in the political history of the United States." Dwight Eisenhower was the most admired man in the world and voters could not forgo the rare opportunity to elect their ideal candidate.

Introduction

It could only happen in America. A man spends his entire life dreaming of and preparing for four years as president of the United States. This man has established and maintained connections with prominent businessmen, union leaders, party bosses, and government officials. He has worked on his image and is one of the most eloquent speakers in America. He knows how to handle Congress and special interest groups. He is devoted to God and has honorable morals. He has developed his position on every policy issue of the day and has a political record to back him up. But most of all, he wants to be president. In fact, it’s all he’s ever wanted. Despite these qualifications, however, the American people deny this man his life-long aspiration. Instead, they elect a man who has no political ambitions or experience. This man has spent his entire adult life in the United States Army. He was a late bloomer even in his own field of expertise. Indeed, he was only a Lieutenant Colonel just eleven years before becoming president. He is known for his abhorrence for politics and politicians, a distaste that was well documented. During World War II, for example, he said apologetically to a friend, "I do not mean to sound like a demagogue nor a politician. In fact, once this war is won, I hope to never hear the word politics." The latter non-politician, Dwight Eisenhower, beat the former career politician, Adlai Stevenson, in a landslide and was rated the ninth best president in American history in a 1982 Chicago Tribune ranking.

A rational person would assume that the election of a relatively non-experienced candidate to this country’s highest civil office could only have been a fluke. During the 1996 campaign, Bob Dole exemplified this nonsensical attitude in stating that "We’re not electing a talk show host. We’re not electing someone who publishes magazines. We’re electing a president of the United States, and I think you want someone with experience." It makes sense to elect someone who has planned for the job all their life, but Americans have been foregoing this option with ever increasing frequency.

Illogical or not, the less experienced candidate was chosen in the 1952 presidential election and similar outcomes have occurred in many elections before and since. For example, Abraham Lincoln emerged in 1860 as a candidate with a weak political resume. He had served four terms in the Illinois Legislature and one disappointing term in the House of Representatives. He made two unsuccessful attempts to win election to the US Senate. He had no administrative experience. He had a limited circle of acquaintances. He had never been abroad and knew no foreign languages. Indeed, upon his inauguration, even Lincoln stated that he was "the humblest of all individuals that have ever been elected to the Presidency." Ironically, the 1982 Chicago Tribune poll ranked him the best president ever to have served this nation. This example of the "common man" politician triumphing over his more experienced counterpart seems to defy common sense.

Nevertheless, the number of politicians who are portraying themselves as the common man is rapidly increasing. Bill Clinton, Ronald Reagan, and Jimmy Carter were all elected president without having served a term in a national office. Add to this the innumerable unsuccessful candidates who have declared their political experience as a token of "a new generation of leadership," and the pool of seemingly unqualified candidates becomes quite large.

American voters have developed a taste for this "dark horse" with meager political experience. Such a candidate is known as a Washington outsider and his embodiment seems to identify with Americans’ postmodern cynical view of politics.

The number of Washington outsiders contending for a seat in national politics has significantly increased since 1952. More specifically, these men have gained considerable strength since the mid 1970’s because of the disillusionment and distrust in government that was caused by the Vietnam war and President Richard Nixon’s Watergate scandal. As a result of this distrust, many American voters often put a premium on qualities that outsiders possess. For example, one voter praised Perot, a 1992 outsider with a dopey grin and a thick Texas accent, because "he made himself a millionaire and I like the way he speaks." Another voter said that Colin Powell, an outsider from the military establishment who has failed to run in 1996, "gives heroism back to America. He’s done a job and proven he can do a job." Some people are content to jump on the bandwagon or just don’t need a reason to vote for a Washington outsider. For example, one voter said of Eisenhower’s 1952 candidacy: "Lots of people think Eisenhower would be a good candidate and with that I agree. But I must say I really don’t know what he stands for. But I would take a chance."

There are several variations of the Washington outsider. Some come from the private sector (e.g. Ross Perot and Steve Forbes) and claim, among other things, that they can stop the bureaucratic waste in Washington because they know how to lead an organization efficiently. Some outsiders come from state governments (i.e. Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton) and argue that they will be worthy presidents because they can provide a fresh perspective to the Oval Office. As Jimmy Carter said while campaigning in 1976, "It’s time for someone like myself to make a drastic change in Washington. The insiders have had their chance and they have not delivered." Finally, there are the increasingly rare outsiders who emerge as generals from the military establishment. Although ten generals have occupied the White House, only three -- Presidents Taylor, Grant, and Eisenhower -- were elected without having served in an elective office. This thesis will focus on generals as Washington outsiders, categorically, and on Dwight David Eisenhower, specifically.

The Need for an Eisenhower as Outsider Study

There exists a vast body of literature on Dwight Eisenhower. Although a steady stream of Eisenhower-related studies have been published since the 1940s and 1950s, the release of unpublished documents in the late 1970s and early 1980s invoked a mini-explosion of Eisenhower publications.

Many of these works provide answers to questions that are fundamental to any study of the presidency: What was the President’s leadership style (i.e. Did he delegate power? Did he approach policy in a passive, hands-off manner or was he an active, detail-craving policy wonk?)? What were his relations like with Congress? with the media? with citizens? with foreign leaders? Was he a good TV president (i.e. did he use rhetoric effectively? Did he have charisma? Could he, as Eisenhower put it, deliver a speech that employed language that was dignified yet "simple enough to sound good to the fellow digging a ditch in Kansas." What were his policies, foreign and domestic, and how did he manifest them? Did he accomplish what he set out to do (i.e. as Reagan put it: is the country better off than it was four years ago?)? What was the president like as a person and how did this figure into his style as a president? Did he fulfill the role as head of state well? Did he fulfill the role of chief executive well? How did he use power? Did he handle crises well? What was his professional background (e.g. state/national elective office holder, businessman, career soldier)? In what way did this background affect his reasons for pursuing the presidency? And, how did this background affect his recruitment to the presidency?

The last three questions in this series address the Washington outsider and are the ones that have received the least amount of attention amongst scholarly circles. However, there is a need to study Washington outsiders, in general, because of the increasing influence that they exercise over the American voter. More specifically, there is sufficient reason to study military Washington outsiders. Although Eisenhower has been the only military Washington outsider to occupy the White House this century, the move to persuade Colin Powell to run for the presidency may have set a new standard for the twenty-first century. Therefore, an in-depth study of how Eisenhower was elected in 1952 will serve as a model to which future military Washington outsiders may emulate. Even though many features of American politics have changed since 1952, much can be gleaned from Eisenhower’s general strategies.

The thesis of this paper asserts that a general’s success in presidential elections is determined by a unique set of criteria. First and foremost is his status as a general. This status, however, is not enough to ensure victory in and of itself. This thesis will argue that a certain group of conditions exist that will augment a general's chance to get elected. The more of these variables that he is able to incorporate into his campaign, the greater his electibility will be. One factor that increases a general's chance of being elected is for him to be regarded as a hero by the public. For all intensive purposes, a general accomplishes this by having led his country to victory in a significant military endeavor. Another way that an election can turn in a general's favor is if he has a broad group of friends and supporters that transcend partisan boundaries. Moreover, he must be mildly conservative and run on the Republican ticket. Above all, a general must have charisma that allows him to appeal to the press and to any voter, black or white, rich or poor. A general must also have some sort of organizational and administrative experience. Finally, a general will not run if he does not hear "a call to duty" from the country. A general, such as General MacArthur, who runs without this motive is seen as a selfish man and will receive bad press and marginal public support.

If a general runs as a moderate conservative -- as Eisenhower did and as Colin Powell would most likely have done -- then the nominating stage of the election will be more difficult to win than the general election. Different nominating systems, however, do not significantly affect the general's strategy. That is, it was just as beneficial for a general to be a hero, a Republican, and for him to have a charismatic personality, and a broad base of friends and supporters in the mixed 1950's system as it is in today's primary system. However, some of the political developments in the past fifty years have worked to an outsider's advantage. For example, because the media influences voters more than parties do, it is not as important for candidates to have the same connections with party elites in today’s system. This increases a general's chance of winning the nomination because he can rely more on his natural appeal to the party rank-and-file. Finally, because the media portrays the campaign more as a game rather than a forum to discuss issues, a general's inexperience with policy is subordinated to his leadership, charisma, and strong morals.

This thesis is concerned with a general's overall chance of getting elected to the presidency and not just his personal strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, it is imperative to discuss other institutional factors. For example, a general has a better chance of being elected if he is not facing an incumbent. His chances increase also if he runs when the economy is in a state of recession or if politicians are not particularly respected -- this is usually the case after a scandal. Additionally, a general’s electibility increases if he runs at a time when the country needs a strong military leader. In this sense, Eisenhower was in a perfect position in 1952 because the country needed a competent to honorably dissolve America's presence in Korea as well as to define the nation’s role in the Cold War. Incidentally, America is currently in a unique position to elect a general, due to President Clinton’s failure to adequately define the country’s role in the post-Cold War world. Thus, this thesis will be particularly useful for American politics if Colin Powell decides to campaign for president within the next few elections.

These institutional factors apply to all candidates’ decisions. Mario Cuomo, for example, did not run in 1992 because he was weary of running against an incumbent president -- George Bush -- who had attained a higher rating by the pollsters than any other president to date. However, a general must be even more perceptive than the typical career politician in making his decision to campaign for the presidency. Regardless of the merits of his governmental inexperience, he must convince voters that he has more to offer the country than the field of political experts who are campaigning against him.

This thesis will begin by comprehensively presenting Eisenhower's path to the presidency: his resistance to candidacy but ultimate acceptance out of a call to duty; his strategy in the Republican nomination; and the extent to which he appealed at a public, private, and institutional level. This thesis will conclude with a summary of these developments and attempt to glean any appropriate lessons for prospective military presidential candidates.

Chapter One

Ike’s Path to Candidacy

Dwight Eisenhower may very well have been the most reluctant successful candidate in American history. In researching Eisenhower, I could not find a single comment, suggestion, or thought that linked his interests and ambitions to the office of President of the United States. Although Eisenhower did respond to questions from reporters, friends, and colleagues about his political interests, this was mostly done out of a reaction to their demands. Indeed, every bone in Eisenhower’s body viewed politics and politicians unfavorably since his formative years as a cadet at West Point. If left to his own devices, Eisenhower would have remained as far away from politics as possible. This, coupled with the fact that the first mention of an Eisenhower candidacy occurred only nine years before he was elected, must come as a shock to those who spend a lifetime aspiring to the Presidency.

The Resistance to Candidacy

Eisenhower's quantum leap to the presidency began in 1943 when newspaper correspondent Virgil Pinkley suggested that Eisenhower would be an ideal presidential candidate in light of the American tradition that awards the presidency to successful military commanders. This suggestion came as a shock to Eisenhower and he replied: "Virgil, you’ve been standing out in the sun too long." During the second World War his time was too precious to waste on such trivialities and speculations. At this time, Ike's...